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Abstract—In this paper, we propose intelligent reflecting
surface (IRS) aided multi-antenna physical layer security. We
present a power efficient scheme to design the secure transmit
power allocation and the surface reflecting phase shift. It aims
to minimize the transmit power subject to the secrecy rate
constraint at the legitimate user. Due to the non-convex nature of
the formulated problem, we propose an alternative optimization
algorithm and the semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation
to deal with this issue. Also, the closed-form expression of
the optimal secure beamformer is derived. Finally, simulation
results are presented to validate the proposed algorithm, which
highlights the performance gains of the IRS to improve the secure
transmission.
Index Terms—Intelligent reflecting surface, physical-layer se-
crecy, secure beamforming, phase shift.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the evolution of the fifth-generation (5G) and be-
yond, high data rate and massive wireless connectivity are in
great demand, causing more concerns on the network energy
consumption [1]. The energy constrain is a critical issue in
various practical applications. Generally, the energy constrain
challenge can be overcome by joint utilization of renewable
energy source, energy-efficient devices, effective deployment
techniques, as well as energy-efficient resource allocation
and signal processing algorithms [2], [3]. However, several
renewable energy sources and energy-efficient devices may
incur high hardware cost. Thus, it is necessary to design an
energy-efficient technique with low hardware cost to build a
sustainable and green wireless network [4].
On the other hand, the security of communications should
be guaranteed for protecting the important/privacy information
transmission, e.g., bank card information, pricing information,
and mobile data message. Traditionally, secure transmission
is realized by conventional cryptographic methods in the
network layer, but those schemes lead to variety of technical
challenges on the key distribution and management in the
communication link. Thus, physical layer security is developed
based on the information theory and a novel metric, secrecy
capacity, of the random channel [5]. Recently, variety of
resource allocation approaches have been widely applied to
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physical layer security to improve the secrecy capacity. Also,
physical layer security has been considered in the multi-
antenna scenario, and resource allocation and signal processing
algorithms [6]–[8]. In secure transmissions, the transmit power
consumption is an important indicator for the improvement of
the secrecy capacity, and the transmit power at the BS should
be minimized to guarantee the transmission requirement of
secrecy metric [9], [10].
In order to ensure the secure communication with low power
consumption, this paper first proposes a novel transceiver-
like technique, i.e., intelligent reflecting surface (IRS)1, to
support the multi-antenna secure communication. IRS, a planar
array, is composed of some reconfigurable reflector elements,
and controlled by a communication-oriented software (e.g.
IRS controller) [11], [12]. The IRS reflecting elements are
generally made of small, very low-cost, and low energy
consumption components which efficiently reflect the desired
signal with an appropriate phase shift without a dedicated
RF processing, en/de-coding, or re-transmission [11]. In [12],
large IRS is introduced to shape the radio waves, improving
the network coverage, also it backscatters the radio waves
generated by cellular base stations to smart devices. Un-
like the active intelligent surface based massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) in [13], the IRS owns flexible
operation mechanism and an array architecture to passively
receive and reflects the desired signal to maximize the total
received power at the user. In comparison with the existing
secure transmission schemes, e.g., information-jamming-aided
secure communication [14] and the relaying-aided secure
communication [15], the IRS-aided secure transmission does
not employ an extra transmitter (i.e., information jammer
or relay) to generate the same/new signals to enhance the
receive power at the legitimate user or to introduce more
interference to degrade the reception at the eavesdropper.
Thus, this transmission mechanism introduces no extra power
consumption. In addition, by operating in the full duplex
(FD) mode, the IRS-aided scheme achieves higher spectrum
efficiency than the relay-aided scheme with the half duplex
(HD) mode [11]. Inspired by those desired properties of the
IRS, we apply the IRS technique to secure communications,
where the desired signal can be reflected by the IRS elements.
By adjusting the phase shifts of the IRS, the transmit power
at the base station (BS) is minimized while quarantining the
secure transmission quality of the legitimate user.
In this paper, we consider a classic multi-antenna secrecy
channel, where a multi-antenna BS with the aid of an IRS
establishes a secure link with a single-antenna legitimate
1It is also known as reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS).
user in the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We minimize the transmit power at the BS subject to
the secrecy rate constraint. Our aim is to design the
secure transmit beamformer at the BS and the reflecting
beamformer via the phase shifter at the IRS. Due to
non-convexity of this problem, we propose an alternative
optimization algorithm2 and semidefinite programming
(SDP) relaxation to tackle this non-convex optimization
problem.
2) In order to gain more insights and reduce the com-
putation complexity, we derive a closed-form transmit
beamforming vector via dual problem and KKT condi-
tions. In addition, a randomization technique is applied
to generate the feasible solution for the high-rank phase
shift matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider an IRS-aided multi-antenna se-
cure transmission as depicted in Fig. 1, where a multi-antenna
BS establishes a reliable link with a single-antenna legitimate
user in the presence of a single-antenna passive eavesdropper.
Each receiver (i.e., legitimate user/eavesdropper) generally
probes two path superimposed signals from both the BS-
user/eavesdropper link and BS-IRS-user/eavesdropper link. We
assume that the BS is equipped with NT transmit antennas, the
IRS is mounted with NR reflecting units. The IRS controller is
required to coordinate its working modes, including reception
mode to estimate the channel state information (CSI) and
reflection mode for data transmission. The channel coefficients
of the BS-user link, the BS-eavesdropper link, the BS-IRS
link, the IRS-user link, and the IRS-eavesdropper link are
denoted by hs ∈ CNT×1, he ∈ CNT×1, G1 ∈ CNT×NR ,
hrs ∈ CNR×1, and hre ∈ CNR×1, respectively.
The IRS elements receive all multi-path received sig-
nals at a physical point, and reflect this combined signal
from this point via IRS planar array. We denote Ψ =
Fig. 1: An IRS-aided multi-antenna secure communication.
Diag (β exp(jα1), β exp(jα2), · · · , β exp(jαNR)) as the di-
agonal matrix associated with the effective phase shifts in all
IRS elements, where αn ∈ [0, 2pi] and β ∈ [0, 1] are the phase
shift and amplitude reflection coefficient on the combined
2Although similar alternative optimization algorithms have been employed
in our work, the solution in [11] and [16] are not applicable to our work
which mainly focuses on the secrecy communication.
desired signal, respectively [11].3 Thus, the received signal
at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper can be written,
respectively, as
ys=
(
hHs +h
H
rsΨG1
)
x+ns, ye=
(
hHe +h
H
reΨG1
)
x+ne,
where ni ∼ CN (0, σ2i ), i ∈ (s, e) denote the thermal
noise at the legitimate user or the eavesdropper with a zero-
mean complex circularly symmetric Gaussian variable with
variance σ2i , respectively. Also, x = ws denotes the desired
signal at the BS, where s denotes the desired signal for
the legitimate user with E{|s|2} = 1, and w ∈ CNT×1
is the secure transmit beamformer. Accordingly, the mu-
tual information at the user and the eavesdropper can be
given by Ru = log2
(
1 +
|(hHs +hHrsΨG1)w|2
σ2s
)
, and Re =
log2
(
1 +
|(hHe +hHreΨG1)w|2
σ2e
)
. The achievable secrecy rate is
given by Rs = [Ru −Re]+ , where [x]+ = max(x, 0).
A. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we consider a power efficient design to
optimize the secure transmit power allocation and the surface
reflecting phase shift. We aim to minimize the secure transmit
power subject to the secrecy rate constraints, which can be
formulated as
min
w,Ψ
‖w‖2,
s.t. Rs(w,Ψ) ≥ R¯, (1a)
| exp(jαn)| = 1, ∀n = 1, ..., NR, (1b)
where R¯ is the target secrecy rate. Problem (1) is non-convex
due to the secrecy rate constraint (1a), and thus it cannot be
solved directly to jointly design the optimal secure transmit
beamformer w and IRS phase shift αn. In the following,
we propose an alternative algorithm to optimize the secure
transmit beamformer and the phase shift.
III. SOLUTION TO PROBLEM (1)
In this section, we propose an alternative optimization
algorithm to design the secure transmit beamformer w and
the phase shift Ψ alternatively. In addition, the optimal beam-
former is derived in terms of closed-form solution. Further-
more, a randomization scheme is presented to tackle the high-
rank phase shift matrix due to the SDP relaxation.
A. Optimal Secure Transmit Beamformer Design
In this section, we solve problem (1) to achieve the optimal
secure transmit beamformer w for given phase shift Ψ. Thus,
problem (1) can be simplified as
min
w
‖w‖2, (2a)
s.t. Ru −Re ≥ R¯. (2b)
3In this paper, we assume β = 1 which is to maximize the reflected signal
for each element of the IRS [11]. Note that the phase shifts is assumed to
be continuously located in [0, 2pi]. However, they are in practical selected
with a finite number of discrete phase shift codebooks from 0 to 2pi for the
circuit implementation [16]. Particularly, we first need to require a proper
initialization of the discrete phase shifts, which is gained via solving the
formulated problem in Section III-A, and then quantizing these continuous
phase shifts to their nearest points from the discrete phase shift codebooks.
Problem (2) is still non-convex. Next, we consider semidefinite
programming (SDP) relaxation to solve it. Let us denote
h¯s =
(
hHs + h
H
rsΨG1
)H
, h¯e =
(
hHe + h
H
reΨG1
)H
, and
define W = wwH , we have
min
W
Tr(W), s.t. rank(W) = 1,
1
σ2s
Tr
[
h¯sh¯
H
s W
]− 2R¯
σ2e
Tr
[
h¯eh¯
H
e W
] ≥ 2R¯ − 1, (3a)
W  0. (3b)
Problem (3) is a standard SDP via removing the non-convex
rank-one constraint, which can be solved by convex optimiza-
tion solvers [17], e.g., CVX. In order to gain more insights and
reduce the computational complexity, we derive a closed-form
solution for the secure beamformer w.
Theorem 1: The optimal solution to problem (2) is derived
in terms of following closed-form expression p∗ = µ∗(2R¯−
1),w∗ =
√
p∗v∗, µ∗ = 1
λmax
(
1
σ2s
h¯sh¯Hs−2
R¯
σ2e
h¯eh¯He
) , v∗ = w¯∗‖w¯∗‖2 ,
and w¯∗ = νmax
(
1
σ2s
h¯sh¯
H
s − 2
R¯
σ2e
h¯eh¯
H
e
)
, where λmax(∗) de-
notes the maximum eigenvalue, and νmax(∗) is the eigenvector
associated with the maximum eigenvalue.
Proof: Refer to Appendix.
B. Phase Shift Design
In this subsection, we design the IRS phase shift Ψ for
given secure transmit beamformer w obtained in Section III-A.
We denote bi = hHi w, r
Hai = h
H
riΨG1w, ∀i ∈ {s, e},
where r = [exp(jα1), exp(jα1), · · · , exp(jαN )]H and ai =
Diag (hri) G1w, ∀i ∈ {s, e} and problem (1) can be reduced
to
Find r, s.t. log2
1 + 1σ2s
∣∣rHas + bs∣∣2
1 + 1σ2e
|rHae + be|2
≥ R¯, (4a)
|r(n)|2 = 1, ∀n ∈ [1, N ]. (4b)
Problem (4) is still intractable due to (4a), thus, we con-
sider the following equivalent modifications to deal with this
non-convex constraint
∣∣rHai+bi∣∣2 = r¯HVir¯, where r¯ =[
rH 1
]H
, and Vi =
[
aia
H
i aib
H
i
bia
H
i |bi|2
]
, ∀i ∈ {s, e}. To this
end, (4) is equivalently modified as
Find r, s.t.
1
σ2s
r¯HVsr¯− 2
R¯
σ2e
r¯HVer¯ ≥ 2R¯−1, (4b). (5)
Next, we employ SDP relaxation to deal with (5) by defining
R = r¯r¯H . This definition guarantees R  0 and rank(R) = 1.
Thus, (5) can be relaxed as
Find R, s.t.
1
σ2s
Tr [RVs]− 2
R¯
σ2e
Tr [RVe] ≥ 2R¯ − 1,
R(n, n)=1, ∀n ∈ [1, N ], R0, rank(R)=1. (6)
It is easily verified that problem (6) is a standard SDP via
removing the non-convex rank-one constraint, which can be
solved in a similar way to Section III-A. In general, the relaxed
problem (6) may not yield a rank-one solution, i.e., rank(R) 6=
1, which reveals that the SDP relaxation is not tight. Thus, we
develop a construction method to obtain a rank-one solution.
Particularly, we employ the eigenvalue decomposition of R as
R = UΘUH , and the feasible beamforming vector of (5) is
constructed as
r¯ = UΘ
1
2κ, (7)
where U ∈ C(NR+1)×(NR+1) and Θ ∈ C(NR+1)×(NR+1) are a
unitary matrix and diagonal matrix with eigenvalues arranged
in decreasing order, respectively, and κ is a vector of complex
circularly symmetric uncorrelated Gaussian random variables
with zero-mean and unit variance. However, problem (6) may
not guarantee its constraints with the independently generation
of Gaussian random vector κ. Thus, we need to re-scale the
phase shift vector r¯ with an appropriate scaling factor ξ to
satisfy all constraints,
r˜ = ξr¯. (8)
We substitute (8) into problem (6),
Find ξ, s.t.
1
σ2s
Tr
[
R˜Vs
]
− 2
R¯
σ2e
Tr
[
R˜Ve
]
≥ 2R¯ − 1,
R˜(n, n) = 1, ∀n ∈ [1, N ], R˜  0, (9)
where R˜ = ρr¯r¯H , ρ = ξ2. The above problem is a standard
linear programming (LP), which can be solved easily, and then
r¯ can be generated via (7) and (8). Finally, we recover the solu-
tion r to problem (4) via r = exp
(
j arg
([
r¯
r¯(N+1)
]
(1:N)
))
,
where [x]1:NR is the first NR elements of the vector x, and
arg(x) represents each element of the vector x correspond-
ing to the phase. We summarize the proposed algorithm in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Alternative optimization algorithm to solve
problem (1).
1) Initialization: IRS phase shift α(0) =
[α01, α
(0)
1 , · · · , α(0)NR ].
2) Repeat:
a) Obtain the optimal secure transmit beamformer
w(n) via Theorem 1 or solving problem (3) for
given α(n).
b) Solve problem (6) for given w(n) to obtain the
solution of the IRS phase shift according to (7)
and (8).
c) Update n = n+ 1.
3) Until Convergence
Now, we analyze the computational complexity of
Algorithm 1. According to [18], the complexity is given by
O (m√ψ ln ( 1ω ) (N3 + 1 +N) +m(N2 + 1 +N) +m2),
where ω is iteration accuracy, ψ = N denotes the threshold
parameter related to the constraints, and m = O(N2).
To proceed, we characterize the convergence of Algorithm
1 via the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The secure transmit power allocation is non-
increasing over each iteration via Algorithm 1.
Proof: Refer to [11].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to validate
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. It is assumed
that the number of the transmit antennas is NT = 8. An
uniform rectangular array (URA) is deployed at the IRS in
x-axis and y-axis, i.e., NR = NxRN
y
R where N
x
R and N
y
R
denote the numbers of reflecting elements along with the
Fig. 2: System deployment.
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Fig. 3: Convergence of Algorithm 1.
x-axis and y-axis, respectively. We set NxR = 5 and linearly
increases NyR with NR. We assume that the noise power is
σ2s = σ
2
e = 10
−9 W. All small-scale channel coefficients are
generated as the identical and circularly complex Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and unit variance. The
large-scale path loss is dependent on the distance between
any two nodes, which is given by PL = A
(
d
d0
)−ρ
,
where A denotes the path loss at the reference distance
d0 = 1 m which is set to A = −10 dB. d represents the
communication link distance of the BS-user (i.e., dBS−user),
the BS-eavesdropper (i.e., dBS−eve), the BS-IRS (i.e., dBS−IRS),
the IRS-user (i.e., dIRS−user) and the IRS-eavesdropper (i.e.,
dIRS−eve), respectively. ρ is the path loss exponent. As
illustrated in Fig. 2, it is assumed that the legitimate user
and eavesdropper are placed in parallel to that of the BS
and the IRS, where we consider two different cases in the
simulation. The distance between the BS and the IRS is set
to dBS−IRS = 50 m or 10 m, and the distances of the vertical
line is assumed dp = 2 m. Accordingly, the distances of the
BS-user link, the BS-eve link, the IRS-user, and the IRS-eve
link are given by dBS−user =
(
d2s + d
2
p
) 1
2 , dBS−eve =(
d2e + d
2
p
) 1
2 , dIRS−user =
(
(dBS−IRS − ds)2 + d2p
) 1
2 ,
dIRS−eve =
(
(dBS−IRS − de)2 + d2p
) 1
2 . The path loss
exponents of the BS-user link, the BS-eve link, the IRS-user
link, the IRS-eve link, and the BS-IRS link are set to
ρBS−user = ρBS−user = 4, ρIRS−user = ρIRS−eve = ρBS−IRS = 2,
respectively.
First, we evaluate the convergence of Algorithm 1 in Fig.
3. From this figure, it is observed that the secure transmit
power first decreases and then converges to a fixed value,
which verifies the effectiveness of the proposed alternative
optimization algorithm.
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Fig. 4: Transmit power versus distance ds.
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Fig. 5: Transmit power versus reflecting surface elements NR.
Next, we evaluate the secure transmit power versus the
distance ds in Fig. 4 for two cases (i.e., dBS−IRS = 50 m
and dBS−IRS = 10 m). From Fig. 4(a), one can observe that
the power consumption of the proposed IRS aided scheme
increases with the distance ds from 20 m to 40 m, and it is
comparable to the scheme without the IRS. This is due to
the fact that the user moves farther away from the BS, which
leads to increasing power consumption, also the IRS cannot
reap its advantage to improve the security. When ds increases
to approximately 40 m to 50 m, the power consumption
of the IRS-aided scheme begins to decrease and obviously
outperforms that without the IRS. This is owing to the fact
that when the legitimate user moves closer to the IRS, it will
receive a strong reflected signal from the IRS, manifesting
the benefits of the IRS. As the distance ds continues to
increase, i.e., ds ≥ 50 m, the reflected signal from the IRS
becomes weaker, thus more transmit power is consumed but
still achieves a better performance than that without the IRS.
In Fig. 4(b), the secure transmit power is evaluated with the
distance dBS−IRS = 10 m. It is observed from this figure that
the IRS-aided scheme outperforms that without the IRS in
terms of the secure transmit power, which also highlights the
effectiveness of the IRS.
Fig. 5 shows the secure transmit power versus the reflect-
ing surface elements NR with ds in order to highlight the
IRS. The legitimate user is placed nearer to the IRS, i.e.,
ds = 45, or 50 m, the IRS-aided scheme becomes more
effective as the reflecting surface elements NR increases, and
it outperforms that without the IRS which remains constant
with NR. This is due to the fact that larger reflecting elements
of the IRS brings a stronger reflected signal to enhance the
reception at the legitimate user.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed IRS aided multi-antenna secure com-
munications. The power efficient design is investigated to min-
imize the transmit power subject to the secrecy rate constraint
at the legitimate user. Due to the non-convex nature of the
formulated problem, we propose an alternative optimization
algorithm and the SDP relaxation to optimize the secure
transmit power allocation and the surface reflecting phase
shift alternatively. In addition, the optimal secure beamformer
is derived in terms of the closed-form expression, and the
rank-relaxation methods for the reflecting phase shift matrix
is presented. Finally, simulation results were presented to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and
superiority of the IRS-aided scheme compared to the scheme
without the IRS.
APPENDIX
In order to prove Theorem 1, the dual problem to (2) is first
investigated, and the Lagrange function is given by L(w, µ)=
wHw + µ
[
2R¯
(
1+ 1σ2s
wH h¯eh¯
H
e w
)
−
(
1+ 1σ2e
wH h¯sh¯
H
s w
)]
,
where µ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint (2b). The dual problem to (2) is expressed as
max
µ≥0
µ(2R¯−1), s.t. A=I−µ
(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
2R¯
σ¯2e
heh
H
e
)
0. (10)
Next, we consider the Lagrangian function of (3) as
L(W, µ1,B) = Tr
[(
I+ 2
R¯µ1
σ2e
h¯eh¯
H
e − µ1σ2s h¯sh¯
H
s −B
)
W
]
+
µ1(2
R¯−1), where µ1 ≥ 0 and B  0 are the dual variables
with the constraints (3a) and (3b), respectively. Thus, its dual
problem is given by
max
µ1≥0
µ1(2
R¯−1), s.t.B=I−µ1
(
1
σ2s
h¯sh¯
H
s −
2R¯
σ2e
h¯eh¯
H
e
)
0. (11)
One can observe that the dual problems (10) and (11) are
identical. Therefore, both problems hold the same solution.
To proceed, we need to show that there exists at least one
zero eigenvalue in B, which indicates the same property holds
in A as well. By exploiting matrix rank property [19], i.e.,
rank(X−Y) ≥ rank(X)− rank(Y), we have
rank(B)≥ rank(Y)−rank
(
µ1
σ2s
h¯sh¯
H
s
)
, (12)
where Y = I + µ12
R¯
σ2e
heh
H
e . From (12), it is observed that
rank(B) is either NT or NT − 1. If rank(B) = NT , it leads
to W = 0, which violates R¯ > 0. Thus, rank(B) = NT − 1
holds, which shows that there exists at least one zero eigen-
value for B. Similarly, A includes at least one zero eigenvalue
as well. On the other hand, the optimal solution of µ is the
maximum value to guarantee the constraint in (10), which
is derived as µ∗ = 1
λmax(
1
σ2s
h¯sh¯Hs − 2
R¯
σ2e
h¯eh¯He )
. Since problem
(2) can be reformulated into a convex optimization problem,
the strong duality holds between problem (2) and its dual
problem (10). Thus, the minimum transmit power is given by
p∗ = µ∗(2R¯ − 1). Problem (2) is equivalently modified as
min
v,p
pvHv, s.t.
vH(I+ pσ2s
h¯sh¯
H
s )v
vH(I+ pσ2e
h¯eh¯He )v
≥ 2R¯,vHv=1, p≥0. (13)
According to (13) and the fact that the optimal secure beam-
former w lies in the null space of Y, we have w∗=
√
p∗v∗,
v∗= w¯
∗
‖w¯∗‖2 , and w¯
∗=νmax
(
1
σ2s
h¯sh¯
H
s − 2
R¯
σ2e
h¯eh¯
H
e
)
.
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